Statements by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body

Geneva – The United States delivered several statements at the meeting of the World Trade Organization’s Dispute Settlement Body on Friday, January 27, 2023. 

1.         SURVEILLANCE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED

BY THE DSB

1. UNITED STATES – ANTI‑DUMPING MEASURES ON CERTAIN HOT‑ROLLED STEEL PRODUCTS FROM JAPAN:  STATUS REPORT BY THE UNITED STATES (WT/DS184/15/ADD.235)

• The United States provided a status report in this dispute on January 16, 2023, in accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU.
   
• The United States has addressed the DSB’s recommendations and rulings with respect to the calculation of anti-dumping margins in the hot-rolled steel anti-dumping duty investigation at issue.
   
• With respect to the recommendations of the DSB that have yet to be addressed, the U.S. Administration will confer with the U.S. Congress with respect to the appropriate statutory measures that would resolve this matter.

1.         SURVEILLANCE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE DSB

 

B.        UNITED STATES – SECTION 110(5) OF THE US COPYRIGHT ACT:  STATUS REPORT BY THE UNITED STATES (WT/DS160/24/ADD.210)

• The United States provided a status report in this dispute on January 16, 2023, in accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU.
   
• The U.S. Administration will continue to confer with the European Union, and with the U.S. Congress, in order to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of this matter.

1.         SURVEILLANCE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE DSB

C.        EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES ‑ MEASURES AFFECTING THE APPROVAL AND MARKETING OF BIOTECH PRODUCTS:  STATUS REPORT BY THE EUROPEAN UNION (WT/DS291/37/ADD.173)
 

• The United States thanks the European Union (“EU”) for its status report and its statement today.
   
• We continue to engage with the EU on these issues, and we have provided recommendations on several occasions as to how the EU can address the undue delays in its approval procedures. 
   
• The United States has described these problems in detail and noted our concerns with the EU’s biotech approval procedures monthly in the DSB and during the semiannual US-EU biotech consultations, including through our most recent consultations in October. 
   
• We again request that the EU move to issue final approvals for all products that have completed science-based risk assessments at the European Food Safety Authority, including those products that are with the Standing Committee and Appeals Committee.  
   
• We note the EU’s recent move to issue approvals on a rolling basis and we welcome this improvement. 

1.         SURVEILLANCE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE DSB

 

4. UNITED STATES – ANTI-DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES ON LARGE RESIDENTIAL WASHERS FROM KOREA: STATUS REPORT BY THE UNITED STATES (WT/DS464/17/ADD.57)

• The United States provided a status report in this dispute on January 16, 2023, in accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU.
   
• On May 6, 2019, the U.S. Department of Commerce published a notice in the U.S. Federal Register announcing the revocation of the antidumping and countervailing duty orders on imports of large residential washers from Korea (84 Fed. Reg. 19,763 (May 6, 2019)).  With this action, the United States has completed implementation of the DSB recommendations concerning those antidumping and countervailing duty orders.
   
• The United States will consult with interested parties on options to address the recommendations of the DSB relating to other measures challenged in this dispute.

1.         SURVEILLANCE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE DSB

E.         UNITED STATES – CERTAIN METHODOLOGIES AND THEIR APPLICATION TO ANTI DUMPING PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING CHINA: STATUS REPORT BY THE UNITED STATES (WT/DS471/17/ADD.49)

• The United States provided a status report in this dispute on January 16, 2023, in accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU.
   
• As explained in that report, the United States will consult with interested parties on options to address the recommendations of the DSB.

1.         SURVEILLANCE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE DSB

F.         INDONESIA – IMPORTATION OF HORTICULTURAL PRODUCTS, ANIMALS AND ANIMAL PRODUCTS: STATUS REPORT BY INDONESIA (WT/DS477/21 – WT/DS478/22/ADD.44)

• The United States continues to have concerns with Indonesia’s compliance with the DSB’s recommendations. 
• With respect to measures 1-17, we would still appreciate further clarity on which regulations now comprise Indonesia’s import licensing regimes and on any forthcoming regulations that will affect the regimes.     
• The United States continues to review Indonesia’s commodity balance mechanism in an effort to understand better how the mechanism will simplify and streamline the permit process, and provide for greater business certainty. 
• We understand that, for the past two years, Indonesia has been significantly delayed in issuing import permits for the first half of the year, at least in part due to delays in setting the commodity balances for the year.  Indeed, Indonesia still has not issued any horticultural product import permits for the first half of 2023 and has issued only a handful of beef import permits. 
• The United States would like Indonesia to clarify whether this extended delay is due to the commodity balance mechanism.  If not, we would like Indonesia clarify the cause of the delay and how it will affect the operation of Indonesia import licensing regimes for horticultural products and animals, and animal products in the first half of 2023.
• The United States remains willing to confer and work with Indonesia to fully resolve this dispute. 

1.         SURVEILLANCE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE DSB

G.        UNITED STATES – ANTI-DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES ON RIPE OLIVES FROM SPAIN: STATUS REPORT BY THE United States (WT/DS577/13)

• The United States provided a status report in this dispute on January 16, 2023, in accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU.
   
• As explained in that report, the United States has completed its implementation of the recommendations of the DSB.
   
• To summarize, on July 6, 2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce (Commerce) initiated a proceeding under section 129 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA).  After initiating the proceeding, Commerce issued questionnaires to the interested parties seeking additional information.
   
• Commerce then issued a preliminary determination and, after providing interested parties the opportunity to submit comments on the issues and analysis in that determination, prepared a final determination.
   
• That final determination, issued on December 20, 2022, revised aspects of Commerce’s analysis and determinations with respect to the calculation of one respondent’s subsidy rate, the determination of specificity, and the calculation of subsidies for processed agricultural products under section 771B of the Tariff Act of 1930 (the Act).
   
• On January 12, 2023, the U.S. Trade Representative directed Commerce to implement those determinations.  Commerce issued a notice to that effect on January 13, 2023.
   
• The notice of the completed implementation was published in the U.S. Federal Register on January 19, 2023, and can be found at 88 Fed. Reg. 3,384.

Second Intervention

• We take note of the EU statement.  Should the EU have any remaining concerns or questions, the United States stands ready to discuss the matter further with the EU.
   
• On the EU statement concerning the findings on section 771B, the United States notes that in Commerce’s determination, Commerce expanded its findings to include a non-restrictive examination of additional factors, addressing concerns in the panel report.  We are prepared to confer further with the EU on this issue.

2.         COLOMBIA – ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES ON FROZEN FRIES FROM BELGIUM, GERMANY AND THE NETHERLANDS (DS591)

 

A.        COLOMBIA'S INTENTIONS REGARDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND RULINGS OF THE ARBITRATORS

• Before we begin, we would like to make the following comments.  The United States and other Members have jointly issued WT/GC/244, “The Joint Statement on Aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine with the Support of Belarus,” which condemns Russia’s actions as a violation of international law, the UN Charter, and fundamental principles of international peace and security.  The United States reiterates its support for Ukraine during this unimaginably difficult time.  We pay tribute to the heroism of the Ukrainian people, their armed forces and Leaders.
   
• The United States intervenes to comment on the Arbitrator’s findings with respect to Article 17.6(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement (“AD Agreement”).
   
• Article 17.6(ii) was key to the acceptance of the other provisions of the AD Agreement.  The existence of such a provision confirms that Members were aware that the text of the AD Agreement could pose particular interpretive challenges, at least in part because it was drafted to cover varying and complex anti-dumping regimes and long-standing differences concerning methodology.  WTO Members agreed, therefore, that it would be a legal error not to respect a permissible interpretation of the AD Agreement.
   
• The question under Article 17.6(ii) is whether an investigating authority’s interpretation of the AD Agreement is a permissible interpretation.  As the United States has explained for years, “permissible” means just that: a meaning that could be reached under the Vienna Convention.^[1]  Article 17.6(ii) itself confirms that provisions of the AD Agreement may “admit[] of more than one permissible interpretation.”
   
• Where that is the case, and where the investigating authority has relied upon one such interpretation, a panel must find the measure to be in conformity with the AD Agreement.  As one panel report stated, “[I]n accordance with Article 17.6(ii) of the AD Agreement, if an interpretation is ‘permissible’, then we are compelled to accept it.”^[2]
   
• The Arbitrator seriously engaged with the text of Article 17.6(ii).  The Arbitrator appropriately recognized that the subparagraphs of Article 17.6 “must be understood in a manner granting special deference to investigating authorities under the Anti-Dumping Agreement.”^[3]  The Arbitrator undertook its textual analysis in a manner that gave effect to the terms of the provision.
   
• The analysis addressed directly the nature of treaty interpretation under the Vienna Convention.  The Arbitrator explained that its “approach assumes, as the second sentence does, that different treaty interpreters applying the same tools of the Vienna Convention may, in good faith and with solid arguments in support, reach different conclusions on the ‘correct’ interpretation of a treaty provision.”^[4]
   
• The Arbitrator went on to note favorably the observation that the Vienna Convention rules “are facilitative not disciplinary and do not ‘instruct the treaty interpreter to find a single meaning of the treaty’ as a former Appellate Body member has written.”^[5]
   
• We agree with this observation and find the Arbitrator’s analysis of Article 17.6(ii) to be persuasive.
   
• The Arbitrator’s analysis differs from – and implicitly rejects – the past reports of the Appellate Body that expressed disregard for the meaning and importance of Article 17.6(ii).
   
• In no WTO dispute did the Appellate Body ever find that there was a permissible interpretation of the AD Agreement other than the interpretation favored by the Appellate Body.  Instead, the Appellate Body simply asserted “the rules and principles of the Vienna Convention cannot contemplate interpretations with mutually contradictory results”^[6]  That assertion was unsupported.  The ordinary meaning of “permissible” is “allowable” or “permitted” – that is, an interpretation that could be reached under customary rules of interpretation.
   
• We welcome the Arbitrator’s willingness to adopt an interpretation that is consistent with the text agreed by Members, even and especially if the interpretation differs from the Appellate Body’s erroneous views.^[7]
   
• We recall that some Members appear to promote “security and predictability” as an independent goal for dispute settlement, and from that derive that appellate interpretations must simply be followed.  But this Arbitrator has developed an interpretation that is more consistent with the text agreed by Members.  Adherence to the texts as negotiated and agreed by Members – rather than consistency for consistency’s sake – assists in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system – per the precise words of Article 3.2 of the DSU.
   
• We look forward to engaging further with Members on the important issues raised in the Arbitrator’s Award.

3.         CHINA – MEASURES CONCERNING TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES

1. REQUEST FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PANEL BY THE EUROPEAN UNION (WT/DS610/8)

Statement by Ambassador María Pagán

• The United States would like to express its support for the complaint brought by the European Union.  The United States requested to participate in the consultations in this dispute in light of its substantial trade interest, but we regret that request was denied by China without explanation.
   
• We are disappointed that China has not lifted its restrictions relating to goods and services of Lithuania and the European Union.  We are also concerned at the lack of transparency on the basis for these restrictions.
   
• Accordingly, the United States continues to call on China to lift these coercive economic measures.  The United States intends to participate in this dispute as a third party.

6.         STATEMENT BY CHINA REGARDING THE PANEL REPORT IN THE DISPUTE: "UNITED STATES – CERTAIN MEASURES ON STEEL AND ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS" (DS544)
 

Statement by Ambassador María Pagán

• The United States is making this intervention with regard to the several agenda items involving national security.
   
• The United States regrets that this item has been placed on the agenda and that China and certain other Members seek to drag issues of national security into the WTO.
   
• The United States rejects the false portrayal of our actions and interests that we have just heard.
   
• The United States continues to be one of the most free, transparent, and competitive economies.  The United States is the world’s largest single-country importer, and U.S. tariffs are among the lowest in the world.
   
• The United States also continues to be one of the most transparent Members of the WTO.  When the United States takes an action, the reasons are made clear both to U.S. citizens and to our trading partners at the WTO.  You know where we stand – and why.
   
• At our recent Trade Policy Review, we appreciated many Members’ recognition of our strong record on transparency and were gratified to hear many Members welcome our record of WTO leadership across all pillars of the organization, including on WTO reform.  U.S. leadership at the WTO reflects our commitment to the organization.
   
• The United States has led by maintaining a fundamentally open economy.  We played a key role in creating the GATT and subsequently the WTO, joining other likeminded countries to negotiate rules dedicated to fairness, transparency, and market-oriented competition, grounded in the rule of law and predicated on values that benefit all.  And the system we helped build embodies an optimistic vision.
   
• However, we have been clear – and will continue to be clear – that the United States will not cede decision-making over its essential security to WTO panels.  The Biden Administration remains committed to preserving U.S. national security including by protecting human rights and democracy across the globe.
   
• For over 70 years, the United States has held the clear and unequivocal position that issues of national security cannot be reviewed in WTO dispute settlement and the WTO has no authority to second-guess the ability of a WTO Member to respond to a wide-range of threats to its security.
   
• This position has been shared by many Members who expressed similar views throughout previous decades at the GATT and WTO when their own security measures were questioned.[8]  Despite this shared history and understanding, some Members have recently chosen to pursue legal challenges to U.S. national security measures in the WTO, undermining our common vision for the WTO as a trade organization.
   
• Adjudicating questions of national security in the WTO is not only incompatible with the purpose of the WTO, a trade organization, but will not advance WTO Members’ shared interests in the WTO as a forum for discussion and negotiation.
   
• From the beginning of the trading system, it has been the U.S. view that the appropriate remedy where a Member is impacted by another Member’s essential security measures is to seek a non-violation / nullification or impairment claim.  The reality is we designed a WTO where rebalancing could take place without interfering with a Member’s sovereign responsibilities in the area of national security.
   
• When it comes to national security, each Member plays a unique role and carries unique responsibilities.  The United States has a responsibility to lead.  The United States government is responsible for protecting its citizens’ security, and, as a nation, the United States is responsible for its commitments to allies and partners.  Neither of these responsibilities can be abridged by the WTO inserting itself into issues of national security.  Nor should the roles and responsibilities of other Members.
   
• In this respect, the Panels’ reports are particularly troubling because they suggest a Member may not take action to protect its essential security interests until after irreparable damage is done – for example, after “armed struggles or outbreak of hostilities” – as if deterrence or preparedness were not critical to national security.[9]  Another report stated, notwithstanding “evidence of the United States and other Members being highly concerned about the human rights situation in Hong Kong, China”, that action might be taken only once the “situation has escalated to a point of breakdown or near-breakdown in the relations between states”.[10]  Are the reports suggesting that the United States needs to take more numerous and severe actions to justify this national security action?
   
• The reports disregard the reality of sovereign nations, who must anticipate – not react to – issues of national security.  The WTO as an institution has no business asserting its own standard that action may only be taken when it is too late.
   
• It was to avoid an outcome such as this that, at every step of these proceedings, from the requests for consultations, to the DSB’s establishment of panels, and throughout the panel proceedings, that the United States has been clear that the WTO is not the appropriate venue to adjudicate matters of national security.  Therefore, the United States cannot support adoption of these fundamentally flawed and damaging reports, which would only further undermine the WTO.
   
• Despite these clear statements, China persisted in pushing the WTO to undertake this review, while simultaneously imposing illegal unilateral retaliatory measures on U.S. exports.
   
• We have seen in the past how China has sought to use WTO dispute settlement to undermine tools that were meant to address unfair trade, such as disciplines on dumping and subsidies.  As we have said before, a WTO that serves to shield China’s non-market policies and practices is not in anyone’s interest.
   
• Likewise, China should not now be able to use the WTO to interfere with Members’ responses to national security issues related to those policies and practices.
   
• Indeed, with this dispute and others, we see China pursuing a strategy that would convert the WTO into a permanent venue for national security disagreements.
   
• The United States for long has been clear that it was a mistake to begin adjudicating national security at the WTO.  We warned at the time that this would open the door to future disputes that would further undermine the foundations of the WTO.
   
• Allowing these erroneous reports to be adopted would only help erode the foundations of the multilateral trading system.  The United States therefore has notified the DSB of its decision to appeal these damaging and erroneous reports.
   
• While there may be those who will criticize the U.S. decision to appeal – or perhaps any U.S. response – the United States will continue taking necessary if unpopular actions when it is the right thing to do.[11]
   
• The U.S. decision to appeal should not be misinterpreted as asking the WTO to reevaluate our national security decisions.
   
• The responsibility is on us – the Members – to tackle this issue head on.
   
• The United States believes that Members need to deepen their collective understanding of this issue that is so critical to all of us.  We intend to raise this fundamental issue as part of our discussions on reform of the WTO dispute settlement system.
   
• Ultimately, we believe Members need to clarify and adopt a shared understanding of the essential security exception, and we therefore intend to seek an authoritative interpretation of Article XXI of the GATT 1994, pursuant to Article XI of the WTO Agreement.
   
• When we as WTO Members can trust that the system we built will respect the rules we agreed – and serve the purpose it is designed to serve –then that system can contribute to upholding rules-based trade, instead of forcing Members to move away and apart.

10.       STATEMENT BY TÜRKIYE REGARDING THE PANEL REPORT IN THE DISPUTE: "UNITED STATES – CERTAIN MEASURES ON STEEL AND ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS" (DS564)
 

Statement by Ambassador María Pagán

• The United States notes that Türkiye has already illegally retaliated, and we refer to our earlier statement under agenda item 6.

12.       STATEMENT BY HONG KONG, CHINA REGARDING THE PANEL REPORT IN THE DISPUTE: "UNITED STATES – ORIGIN MARKING REQUIREMENT" (DS597)
 

Statement by Ambassador María Pagán

• We refer to our statement under agenda item 6, and take this opportunity to remind Members of the serious consequences of the flawed interpretation of Article XXI of the GATT 1994 in the US – Origin Marking Requirements panel report. 
   
• The report in this dispute further illustrates the deep concerns we raised earlier in this meeting – and over the course of this dispute.
   
• The challenged actions with respect to Hong Kong, China were based on well-grounded determinations implicating U.S. essential security interests relating to democracy and human rights.
   
• And the United States does consider democratic principles and human rights to be critical to its essential security interests – as is reflected in the U.S. National Security Strategy.
   
• These actions followed a series of actions by the People’s Republic of China (or PRC) that have increasingly denied the autonomy and freedoms promised to the people of Hong Kong, which culminated in part with the national security legislation imposed by the PRC on Hong Kong.  My colleague will elaborate.

[U.S. Delegation:]

• As the challenged Executive Order states on its face: “Under this law, the people of Hong Kong may face life in prison for what China considers to be acts of secession or subversion of state power—which may include acts like last year’s widespread antigovernment protests. The right to trial by jury may be suspended. Proceedings may be conducted in secret. China has given itself broad power to initiate and control the prosecutions of the people of Hong Kong through the new Office for Safeguarding National Security. At the same time, the law allows foreigners to be expelled if China merely suspects them of violating the law, potentially making it harder for journalists, human rights organizations, and other outside groups to hold the PRC accountable for its treatment of the people of Hong Kong.”
   
• The U.S. Secretary of State has since continued to certify that Hong Kong, China, does not warrant treatment under U.S. law in the same manner as prior to July 1, 1997, in light of its findings that the PRC has taken new actions to erode rights and freedoms in Hong Kong, in direct contravention of its obligations under the Hong Kong Basic Law and the Sino-British Joint Declaration, which promised Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy.^[12]
   
• Indeed – and as we documented to the Panel – over the course of the dispute proceedings with Hong Kong, China, many of those serious concerns further materialized in Hong Kong. 
   
• Most prominently, the National Security Law has been used as a blunt tool to quash democratic dissent, and as a result the electoral system in Hong Kong, China, was overhauled by “limiting political participation, reducing democratic representation, and stifling political debate.”^[13]
   
• For example, former lawmakers and prominent pro-democracy activists were subsequently arrested or fled Hong Kong, China, to seek political asylum since the passage of the law.  Many who remained were charged and sentenced to prison.^[14]  
   
• On July 14, 2020, the PRC warned that elections to select pro-democracy candidates for Legislative Council may violate the National Security Law.^[15]  Subsequently, on July 30, 2020, various pro-democracy candidates were barred from running in the September 2020 Legislative Assembly election based on an alleged risk of collusion with foreign forces and opposition to the National Security Law.^[16]  
   
• On November 11, 2020, 15 pro-democracy politicians resigned from the legislature due to a measure imposed by Beijing to disqualify four sitting legislative members deemed to be “unpatriotic”.^[17]  On January 6, 2021, more than 50 former lawmakers and pro-democracy activists were arrested for participating in or organizing elections in 2020.^[18]  
   
• The National Security Law also had a chilling effect on the freedoms of speech and of the press.  On July 2, 2020, only two days after passage of the law, the Hong Kong government declared a protest slogan illegal because it breaches the National Security Law.^[19]  On July 5, 2020, the Education Bureau called for review of textbooks to ensure they do not violate the National Security Law.^[20]  On July 8, 2020, the government banned in schools the singing of a popular protest song.^[21]
   
• On August 10, 2020, media executive Jimmy Lai was arrested under the National Security Law for suspected collusion with foreign forces, and he was subsequently sentenced to prison for protests in 2019.^[22]  The authorities later raided Apple Daily, the publication which he founded, on charges of using reporting to endanger national security,^[23] forced its closure,^[24] charged its executives with collusion with a foreign country, and denied their bail.^[25]  
   
• On February 4, 2021, the Education Bureau released guidelines for schools on national security and banned any political participation or expression on campuses.^[26]  The Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union, an organization with around 95,000 members, was disbanded due to the National Security Law.^[27]  More recently, Hong Kong University removed a statue from its campus out of fear of legal risks.^[28]
   
• This is not a comprehensive list of developments that have occurred since the National Security Law was enacted, but the picture is clear.  Indeed, many Members had publicly shared our concerns about the erosion of human rights, speech and press freedoms in Hong Kong, China.^[29]
   
• The United States explained to the panel that it considers democratic principles and human rights to be critical to its essential security interests. We acknowledge that not all Members value democratic principles or human rights, or perceive them as relevant to their essential security interests.  But the United States does – as is reflected in the U.S. National Security Strategy^[30] – and it was on this basis that the United States adopted the measure challenged by Hong Kong, China.    
   
• Yet, the U.S. evaluation of these circumstances, and its determination that they required responsive action, was disregarded. 
   
• Instead, the panel found that the pattern of human rights abuses and the erosion of autonomy in Hong Kong, China did not “meet the requisite level of gravity to constitute an emergency in international relations under Article XXI(b)(iii).”^[31]  The panel based its conclusion on a subjective assessment of the state of relations between Members, including the United States, China, and Hong, Kong, China,^[32] including in part on the finding that the United States continues to cooperate with Hong Kong, China, in certain areas.^[33]
   
• The United States fundamentally disagrees with the panel’s approach, which suggest a state ought to defer consideration of its essential security interests until after a breakdown in relations.  A WTO Member cannot be expected to wait until it is too late to act, or be required to sever relations as a prerequisite for other action it considers necessary. 
   
• The WTO does not have the competence or the authority to assess the foreign affairs relationships of a Member.  Nor does it have the competence or authority to pass judgment on the value that the United States – and some other Members – place on freedom and human rights, and the actions they take in seeking to secure those values. 
   
• Again, the United States cannot support adoption of this fundamentally flawed and deeply concerning report, which would only further undermine the WTO.

Second Intervention: Statement by Ambassador María Pagán

• The United States welcomes China’s and Hong Kong’s recognition that the WTO is not a forum for adjudicating national security. 
   
• That is what we have been saying all along.
   
• The United States would like to know:  Does China intend to maintain that position with respect to its new challenge? 

13.       APPELLATE BODY APPOINTMENTS: PROPOSAL BY SOME WTO MEMBERS (WT/DSB/W/609/REV.23)

Statement by Ambassador María Pagán
 

• Members are aware of the longstanding U.S. concerns with WTO dispute settlement.  Those concerns remain unaddressed, and the United States does not support the proposed decision. 
   
• The United States believes that fundamental reform is needed to ensure a well-functioning WTO dispute settlement system.  A well-functioning dispute settlement system supports WTO Members in the resolution of their disputes in an efficient and transparent manner, and in doing so limits the needless complexity and interpretive overreach that has characterized dispute settlement in recent years.     
   
• The first step towards reform is to better understand the interests of all Members in WTO dispute settlement.  The United States has been engaging with Members to advance this goal and we look forward to continued engagement.  We appreciate the deeply substantive and informative discussions over the past several months.  These informal discussions, which are guided by an interest-based approach, reflect a significant departure from the stale conversations of past years.  We are pleased that delegations trusted in the merits of interest-based problem solving and took these opportunities to speak with one another, rather than at another.  These dialogues enabled delegations to gain a better understanding of each other’s perspectives on the value of dispute settlement and how that value might be maximized across the WTO Membership. 
   
• We acknowledge that considerable work remains and that achieving dispute settlement reform – that is, fundamental reform to meet the needs of all WTO Members to the greatest extent possible – will not be easy.  But the United States continues to believe that working collectively towards that goal provides the greatest chance of achieving durable, lasting reform. 
   
• The United States is committed to working towards an improved system.  We look forward to engaging further with those Members that also see value in an improved and reformed dispute settlement system that is accessible to all. 

14.       OTHER BUSINESS

            A.        STATEMENT BY NORWAY CONCERNING THE PANEL REPORT IN UNITED STATES – CERTAIN MEASURES ON STEEL AND ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS (DS552)

Statement by Ambassador María Pagán
 

• The United States refers to its statement under agenda item 6.
   
• The United States also refers Norway to the U.S. notification to the DSB of its intention to appeal, stating U.S. willingness to confer with Norway on the way forward in this dispute. 
   

2. STATEMENT BY SWITZERLAND CONCERNING THE PANEL REPORT IN UNITED STATES – CERTAIN MEASURES ON STEEL AND ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS (DS556)
    

Statement by Ambassador María Pagán

• The United States refers to its statement under agenda item 6.
   
• The United States also refers Switzerland to the U.S. notification to the DSB of its intention to appeal, stating U.S. willingness to confer with Switzerland on the way forward in this dispute.